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Abstract 
Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of 
collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the 
agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the 
occurrence of collusion is more likely when the agent has information about the supervisor. 
This result suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal 
relationships between public officials and potential bribery,  may be reduced by the means of 
staff rotation. Evidence from an experimental study supports this proposition. 
 
JEL Classification:   D82, K42 
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 1. Introduction 
 
     Corruption has long been recognized as an important and pervasive phenomenon, which 
strongly affects the creation and the distribution of wealth. This topic is of main interest for 
the international economic community, as shown by the numerous efforts from international 
organizations to propose solutions for this problem. Among the most important initiatives, 
one can mention ongoing international projects to fight corruption financed by the United 
Nations, the World Trade Organization and also the Council of Europe. For example among 
OCDE countries, a recent convention has been approved in order to combat bribery of foreign 
officials in international business transactions. The negative impact of corruption on 
economic development has been well documented (see the survey of Bardhan, 1997). 
Corruption affects the redistribution of surplus and creates distortions in the production of 
wealth owing to its illegal nature. 
  
      Many theoretical studies have paid an increased attention to this problem. The purpose of 
the economic research is to provide a better understanding of illegal activities and their 
organizations, in order to lessen the level of corrupt behavior. When studying how the 
magnitude of corruption can be reduced, two main initiatives can be identified
1
. 
 
      A first set of instruments deals with a direct influence of public decisions upon individual 
behavior, for example with the help of moral campaigns and codes of conduct against bribery. 
A second set of instruments concerns a reforms of the organizational structure in which 
transactions take place and indirect arrangements to curb the development of corrupt 
activities. By analyzing how corruption is organized ranging from centralized structures to 
more decentralized systems in numerous countries, economic literature suggested that there 
may exist more favorable grounds for the emergence and the extension of corruption. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) argue that corrupt transactions are lower when they are organized that 
when they are competitive. The negative externalities that bureaucrats impose on each other 
are internalized to maximize corruption rent when bureaucrats collude in bribe setting. With 
centralization of bribery, the efficient cost of corruption is also minimized by the possibility 
of lump sum corruption (Bardhan ,1997). 
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 In this debate, an important element is the distribution between external corruption which involves an 
individual violation of duty and internal corruption which is likely to take the form of collusion. 
          As one focuses on the environment in which bribery is more likely to emerge, we have 
to pay attention to the characterization of the relationships between public officials and 
potential bribers. In particular, it turns out that corruption is usually part of a long-term 
connection between the two parties, since bribery is built on strong reciprocity and trust. 
Even, if the context is different from corruption, it is usually found in experiments on public 
goods games that the level of cooperation is stronger with fixed partners than with random 
partners ( Croson, 1996, Keser and Van Winden, 2000).This argues in favor of reinforcing 
effects of long-term relationships on the level of degree of collusion. Thus, this suggests a 
simple way to modify the occurrence of corruption. An incentive system which promotes 
rotation mechanisms of supervisory personnel is likely to prevent corrupt behavior at the 
individual level. To date, this potential impact of staff rotation on corrupt transactions has 
been largely neglected by the economic literature, with exception of Abbink (1999). 
 
         From an empirical viewpoint, Abbink (1999) attempts to test the effectiveness of this 
instrument using an experimental bribery game in which pairs of potential bribers and public 
officials are randomly matched in every round, a scenario which is compared with the  
analogous treatment with fixed partners. The results show that the introduction of staff 
rotation leads to a significant reduction in the level of corruption. But to the best to our 
knowledge, there exists no previous theoretical study on this valuable issue. While Bac (1996) 
suggests that rotation is an effective means to improve monitoring mechanisms, there is no 
formal proof in the literature that an official institution has an incentive to implement rotation 
of supervisory personnel as a measure against corruption. Therefore, the purpose of our paper 
is to consider this problem by studying the occurrence of collusion in a three-layer 
hierarchical structure, following the recent strand of literature that explores the principal-
supervisor-agent paradigm. 
 
    Indeed, since the seminal contribution of Tirole(1986) and Laffont (1990), economists have 
extended the standard principal-agent model by including a third party, the supervisor. This 
situation, in which the principal is able to acquire information about the agent from the 
supervisor’s report at lower cost, gives rise to the possibility of collusion between the 
supervisor and the agent in order to manipulate the information sent to the principal. In this 
context, it may be shown that a direct mechanism will be optimal and the supervisor will 
reveal his information truthfully to the principal, so that collusion does not arise in 
equilibrium ( see Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993, Tirole, 1986)
2
. However, this collusion-
proofness principle is not expected to hold as one accounts for renegotiation between the 
agent and the principal after the latter has received information from the supervisor ( 
Strausz,1997).Collusive behavior may also arise in equilibrium when there exists different 
types of supervisors with different levels of scruple ( Tirole, 1992). 
 
       To study the theoretical impact of staff rotation on the level of corruption, this paper 
describes a principal-agent relationship with a supervisor in which we focus on the role of 
information structure between the agent and the supervisor upon the occurrence of collusion. 
In particular, we extend the previous literature to a setting where the principal has no 
information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s 
preferences. The type of supervisor is given by a psychic cost entailed by the participation in 
corrupt transactions. Then we show this information structure affects the probability of 
collusion in a hierarchical organization. The main result of our paper is to provide a formal 
argument proof that rotation of supervisory personnel is indeed an effective measure in the 
combat against bribery. 
 
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a basic 
model with a three-tier hierarchy: a principal, an agent and a supervisor. There exists a 
possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent. In section 3, we characterize the 
optimal side contract and the probability of collusion respectively when the agent does not 
know the supervisor and when the agent has information about the supervisor. In section 4, 
we formally prove that the occurrence of collusion is more likely in the latter case, suggesting 
that corruption may be reduced by the means of staff rotation. We also include evidence from 
an experimental study that argues in favor of this proposition. Concluding comments are in 
section 5. 
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 In Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), the optimal incentive system is affected by the possibility of collusion with an 
external supervisor. Sometimes, the external/internal supervisor will not be used as a response to possible 
collusion. 
   2. The Model 
      We consider a three-tier hierarchy which involves a principal , an agent and a supervisor. 
For our presentation, we consider that the principal is the head of the tax collection agency, 
the supervisor is the tax collector, and the agent is the tax payer. There are two key 
assumptions in our model. On the one hand, the principal has never the supervisor’s 
information structure. On the other hand, the agent may have information about the 
supervisor’s preferences. Let us describe the structure of the model. 
 
      The principal, who is intended in controlling the agent’s activity, want to get information 
about the exact level of income earned by the agent. The principal hires a supervisor to 
monitor the action of the agent and the principal offers a contract to the supervisor to 
discipline the agent. Before contracting takes place, the supervisor learns the agent’s level of 
income. The role of the supervisor is to make a report to the principal, whose content is 
valuable source of information for the principal; then, the supervisor receives a payment from 
the principal depending on the report that he makes. This report, which specifies the agent’s 
level of income, may be untruthful if the supervisor and the agent agree to collude. The report 
can only be untruthful if the tax collector and the taxpayer agree on sending a falsified report 
to the principal
3
.When collusion occurs, it is accompanied by a covert transfer from the agent  
to the supervisor. This transfer is part of an enforceable side-contract between the supervisor 
and the agent, which specifies the amount of covert transfer from the agent to the supervisor. 
 
      Let   be the state if information obtained by the supervisor about the tax payer’s 
economic situation. The type of agent is characterized by the parameter , which corresponds 
to his level of income. There are two cases. With probability  1,0p , the supervisor 
observes the true value   and   . With probability    1,01  p , the supervisor learns 
nothing about the type of agent and  . Thus, for a given , the supervisor’s signal is 
defined by    , . Now, let r be the supervisor’s report to the principal. This report is 
also   ,r ( see Tirole, 1986, Laffont and Tirole, 1993). While the tax collector can only 
report r  if he has learned nothing about the agent, he can either tell the truth r  or 
send a falsified report r  otherwise. Hence, the knowledge of the type of agent    may 
give rise to a rent for the supervisor. 
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 As noted by Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), this means that the agent is unable to force the supervisor to send a 
falsified report and the supervisor cannot falsify the report without the help of the agent. 
       Indeed, when the tax collector’s search for information has been fruitful, the supervisor is 
in a position to manipulate the information transmitted to the principal. Thus, the supervisor 
has a strategic role in the implementation of the tax policy decided by the fiscal authority. 
When the tax collector observes the income parameter of the taxpayer    , the agent has 
then an incentive to collude with the supervisor, in exchange of the dissimulation of his true 
parameter   ( Tirole, 1986). The agent simply bribes the tax collector to prevent him from 
revealing the level of income  . To suppress reporting, the side contract specifies an amount 
of covert transfers  b  from the agent to the supervisor as function of the type  . The aim 
of bribery is to prevent the rent value  v  for the agent which is involved by the asymmetric 
information between the parties. 
 
      Let us examine in greater detail the possibility of collusion. A key assumption in our 
framework is that the preferences of the supervisor are never observed by the principal. In this 
incomplete information setting, the principal knows that the supervisor is expected to choose 
one the following issue. The tax collector may either i) refuse the side contract proposed by 
the agent and reveal the true information to the tax collection agency or ii) accept the side 
contract with a covert transfer which depends on the agent’s level of income   . If the 
supervisor when monitoring may either report the agent’s type or accept bribe, there is still a 
probability that the supervisor detect the collusion between the  tax collector and the taxpayer 
( see Mookherjee and Png ,1995). Hence, this threat of punishment if caught, for example by 
paying a financial penalty, may lead the supervisor not to accept the side-contract with the 
agent. 
 
    To account for this possibility of rejection of the side contract, we consider that the 
supervisor faces a psychic cost  when he agrees on collusion with the agent. This 
hypothesis clearly deals with the place of moral obligation in preference systems. In economic 
theory, a standard approach is to assume that the agents fee moral disutility when they attempt 
to infringe social convention
4
. For example, the supervisor may be morally reluctant to accept 
a bribe from the agent, as in the model of Besley and McLaren (1993) in which honest agents 
never take bribe and regard their integrity as priceless. In the context of the literature of 
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 Qizilbash (1994) notes that the two approaches have to be distinguished concerning morals ans preferences. On 
the one hand, morality can directly enter into the individual’s utility function through negative feelings. On other 
hand, moral considerations can be incorporated by the use of lexical preferences. 
corruption, many studies have taken into account the existence of a psychic cost in terms of 
guilt or moral disgust when acting against the moral convention ( see among other Block and 
Heineke, 1975, Andvig and Moene, 1990). Some agents may have higher psychic costs than 
others and more honest people are expected to get more disutility from bribery, since they 
attach a greater weight to the cost associated with collusion and the possibility of personal 
disgrace or shame if caught. 
 
    
      We make the following assumptions concerning this level of psychic cost  . It is defined 
on the state space  1,0 and it is characterized by the density function  h  and by the 
distribution function   H . In order to get closed forms solutions (without loss of 
generality), we further assume that this distribution function which is given 
   


0
dcchH  can be written as 
                                H ,                                                                                    (1) 
where the parameter  and   are such that  1,0 and  1,0  
     
     The tax collection agency rewards the tax collector for his report on the agent’s income. 
Let  s  be the wage offered by the principal to the supervisor when the latter reports the 
observed signal  r . In that case, the supervisor which is characterized by the level of 
psychic cost  accepts the side contract offered by the agent if and only if the net benefit 
expected from collusion is greater than the level of wage proposed by the principal. Thus , the 
following condition must hold for the covert transfer  b : 
   
                                             sb                                  (2) 
 
   Given the definition of the distribution function  H , the probability of collusion which 
is given by :                 ) (Pr  sbob  may be written as : 
                                       ) (Pr  sbHsbob                                  (3) 
 
This probability indicates the  frequency of collusive behavior among supervisors. The 
occurrence of collusion has a standard form. One can note that a tax collector is more likely to 
accept a side contract from the agent when the latter offers a high value for the covert transfer. 
Conversely, the probability of collusion is a decreasing function of the level of wage paid by 
the principal to the agent. 
 
 Our aim in this setting is to examine how the information structure about the psychic cost 
between the supervisor and the agent may influence the frequency of collusion between theses 
two parties. In the next section, we characterize the optimal side contract whether the agent 
has or no information about the supervisor’s preferences. 
 
  3. The Pattern of Collusion 
 
  3.1 Asymmetric Information     
     We begin the analysis by the situation in which the agent has no information about the 
type   of supervisor. Since the revelation of the truth by the supervisor to the principal 
lowers the agent’s rent, the tax payer offers a lateral transfer  b  to the tax collector, whose 
amount is given by the following proposition. 
 
      Proposition 1: Under asymmetric information, the optimal covert transfer of the side 
contract offered by the agent to the supervisor is : 
                                                      




 svb




1
1
1
                                            . 
 
Proof  : 
Since the agent does not know the preferences of the supervisor, the optimal amount of 
transfer is given by the maximization of of the net expected rent derived by the agent and 
defined by :               v) (Pr  bsbob                                      (4) 
Let  b  be the solution of : 
            bvsbHArgMaxb ~~                                          (5) 
The first order condition is : 
              
 .
.~
0..
~
h
H
vbHhbv                                    (6) 
Given  the distribution function    H , we get the following condition: 
               01     sbbvsb                                (7) 
so that we finally deduce the optimal solution : 
     




 svb




1
1
1
                                                            (Q.E.D). 
 
 
 Let us interpret the previous result. With uncertainty about the type of the supervisor, the 
agent proposes a side contract which induces the supervisor to mispresent the signal to the 
principal . When tax collector accepts the lateral transaction with the agent, the optimal bribe 
corresponds to a weighted sum ( convex combination) of the rent  v  obtained by the agent 
and the wage  s  offered by the principal .On can remark that the share of the agent’s rent 
received by the supervisor is an increasing function of the fraction  


1
. In fact, this latter 
value indicates the mean level of the psychic cost for the tax collector. For  1,0 , the 
mean psychic cost is defined by :          


1
0
1
0 1 

  dccccdHE . So, the agent has 
to propose a higher amount of bribe to compensate a supervisor characterized by an important 
average psychic cost. 
 
Corollary 1 Under asymmetric information, the optimal probability of collusion and 
corruption is  : 
                                        
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







 svsvHsbH 














 . 
Proof: 
The probability of collusion is given by:                  ) (Pr  sbHsbob   
From the proposition 1 the optimal lateral transfer is :      




 svb




1
1
1
 and 
hence par simple substitution ,we get our announced result ; the probability of corruption is: 
                     
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







 svsvHsbH 














 (Q.E.D) 
 
 
 We briefly examine how the probability of collusion is affected by modification of the 
supervisor’s wage and the agent’s rent. On the one hand, collusion between the two parties is 
more likely when the retention of information by the supervisor benefits the agent. Therefore, 
it is an increasing function of the rent   v : 
 
0


v
H
. On the other hand, the probability 
of collusion is lowered by the level of salary offered by the principal to the supervisor, since 
the bribe becomes less attractive for the tax collector : 
 
0


s
H
. An additional comments 
deals with the interpretation of the parameter  1,0 . We argue that this parameter may be 
seen as the elasticity of corruption between the supervisor and the agent. Indeed, it is 
equivalent to the shadow cost   of the side transfer for the agent as defined in Laffont and 
Tirole (1993, chapter 11), using the equivalence


1
 . Thus, the probability of collusion can 
be rewritten as            
1
1










svH .  Clearly , we have : 
   
0
1












sv
HLim                                        (8) 
meaning that an infinite value of shadow cost of the agent’s bribe prevents from collusive 
behavior among three-tier hierarchy
5
. 
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 Laffont and Tirole (1993) do not discuss the issue of the supervisor’s preferences in problems of regulation 
under possible collusive behaviors   in three-tier hierarchies. In our framework, the monetary value of the agent’s 
collusive activity may be seen as endogenous. 
3.2 Full Information 
      Now, we examine the problem when the agent has perfect information about the 
supervisor’s type preferences  . For the two parties , there is again the possibility to sign a 
side contract that induces the supervisor to mispresent the agent’s level of income to the 
principal. The tax payer attempts to bribe the tax collector in order to prevent him from 
revealing that the income   is favorable to the agent. Thus, the supervisor and the agent are 
in position to bargain over the amount of lateral transfer. 
 
     It is well known that the issue of how the tax payer and the tax collector want to split  the 
surplus generated by the side contract is only  a matter of bargain power. For convenience, we 
make the following assumption on the bargaining process. The supervisor and the agent 
choose a side payment resulting from a Nash equilibrium. When the two parties play such a 
Nash game , the optimal transfer is given in the following proposition. 
 
  Proposition 2   Under full information the optimal side transfer is : 
                                   svb  1  
  where  is the measure of supervisor’s bargaining power. 
 
Proof: 
The supervisor and the agent play a Nash game to determine the side transfer  b . The 
Nash equilibrium is given by the product of the rents respectively for the supervisor 
     sb   and for the agent       bv  , with bargaining weight  and 
 1 . Thus the optimal side contract is solution of : 
                                1
~
~
 bvsbMaxArgb
b
                        (9) 
 
The rent extracted by the supervisor depends on the psychic cost. From the first order 
condition , by simple derivation  , we get the announced result: 
                         svb  1                                                 (Q.E.D) 
 
The characterization of the optimal side contract under full information is very close to the 
one under asymmetric information, but with an additional variable which is the psychic cost 
resulting from collusion. The covert transfer is now a weighted sum of the rent  v  obtained 
by the agent and both the wage  s  and the moral cost   for the supervisor. When the tax 
collector accepts a bribe , he receives a full compensation which is an increasing function of 
these two variables ,  s  and  . Finally, the transfer varies in accordance with the 
bargaining powers of the two parties. The share of the agent’s rent received by the supervisor 
is increasing in his own index of bargaining power  . 
 
Corollary 2   Under full information, the optimal probability of corruption is given by: 
                                             svsvHsbH      . 
 
Proof: 
 From the definition of the occurrence of corruption and by substitutions we obtain :                     
                   ssvsb  1PrPr , hence we can 
write :                svsvsb  PrPr  which is the 
announced result.                                                                                       (Q.E.D) 
 Two comments are in order. Firstly as in the asymmetric information case, collusion is more 
likely to occur for a greater value of the agent’s rent and for a lower wage offered by the 
principal. Secondly , the probability of corruption occurrence is absolutely not affected by the 
bargaining powers of the parties involved in the side contract when one considers a Nash 
equilibrium solution. 
 
 
 4. Bureaucratic Staff Rotation and Corruption 
  
4.1 Lessening the occurrence of corruption 
     Using the previous framework, we are now in a position to propose an additional 
instrument against the extension of bribery. It has been previously suggested that long term 
relationships between potential bribers and public officials were favorable to the emergence 
of corrupt transactions. The model that we have described before allows us to provide a 
formal argument of the preventive effect of rotation mechanisms on corruption. 
 
 
 Corollary 3 Collusion between the supervisor and the agent is more likely to occur under 
symmetric information than under asymmetric information. 
 
Proof: 
Using corollary 1 and Corollary 2, we know that the probabilities of collusion are respectively 
defined by : 
                
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







svsvH 














 
under asymmetric information and : 
                                                svsvH   
under symmetric information between the two parties. Therefore , when       ,vs  , 
we arrive to the following result: 
                                                sv            
1
 





sv 






       (10) 
This formally proves that the likelihood of corruption is higher when the agent has full 
information about the supervisor’s preferences in the three-tier hierarchal model.   (Q.E.D) 
   
       This result is able to explain why a tax collection agency is induced to implement rotation 
of its supervisory personnel against bribery temptation. Indeed, when the agent has a perfect 
information about the type of supervisor ( given by the moral or psychic cost), one expects a 
greater tendency for the tax payer to offer bribes. Conversely, the behavior of the supervisory 
staff seems more difficult to predict when the tax payer does not know the preferences of the 
tax collector. This latter situation clearly increases the weight of uncertainty attached to 
corrupt transactions, thereby reducing the offers of covert transfers. Thus, our framework 
points out that corruption depends on information structure between public officials ans the 
users of these services. 
 
       An additional feature that we have not taken ino account in our presentation deals with 
reciprocity between the two parties. Indeed, in this paper, we have restricted our attention to a 
static hierarchical model which corresponds to one-shot environment. However, it is often 
argued that bribery is also built on trust and reciprocity. Clearly, this neglected effect is 
expected to reinforce the effectiveness of staff rotation as a measure against corruption. As 
detailed in Abbink (1999) , two main arguments suggest that long term relationships create a 
favorable environment for the extension of bribery. On the one hand, the tax collector would 
be more tempted to participate in side contracts since he is more likely to be rewarded for  
cooperation by receiving additional side transfers at later encounters. On the other hand, the 
tax payer would be more trustful in the reciprocation of the tax collector, the latter being 
probably more cooperative
6
 . 
   
      While staff rotation is a suitable instrument to reduce corruption, we have neglected in the 
previous the existence losses entailed by job rotation. In our simple model, we are not able to 
account for both the cost and the benefits of staff rotation
7
. Clearly , a rotation mechanism 
remains a costly instrument for organizational structures despite of its bribery-reducing 
impact. Some examples of rotation costs are linked to the settlement into a new supervisory 
function in a different place, with additional expenditures to finance the change of location, 
and also to training costs. Indeed, public officials have to be better educated with the 
implementation of job mobility since a broader scope of capabilities and responsibilities are 
expected from them ( see Abbink, 1999). These additional training costs are likely to increase 
the level of personnel salaries. At least, public officials will have a lower acquaintance with 
current affairs, thus reducing the effectiveness of their supervisory function against 
corruption.  
 
      Because of these efficiency losses, the benefits of staff rotation have to be substantial in 
order to promote this instrument in the combat against bribery. Knowing the effectiveness of 
the staff rotation regime is the concern of empirical considerations. However, the influence of 
rotation on corruption sets two main problems from an empirical perspective (Abbink, 1999). 
On the hand, there exist serious difficulties when one attempts to get a reliable measure of the 
level of corruption between public officials and potential bribers, even before the introduction 
of rotation mechanisms. On the other hand, instruments against bribery are usually 
implemented only after the occurrence of corrupt transactions. Thus, interpretation of 
empirical evidence may be misleading since observed behaviors are likely to be the result of a 
                                                 
6
 Corruption is mainly characterized by reciprocal relationships between bribers and public officials, negative 
welfare effects and penalties in case of discovery: corruption remains a risky activity both for the bribers and the 
bribees  ( see Abbink et al.,1999). 
7
 For an overview on the costs and the benefits of job rotation, see Gosgel and Miceli (2001); In a different 
setting related to the firm’s choice, some firms promote high degrees of specialization in their organization of 
work, but the rotation of jobs also produces certain benefits that outweigh lost productivity from reduced 
specialization. 
fait accompli. Fortunately, the relevance of staff rotation ma y be examined  using an 
experimental corrupt game. 
 
 
   4.2 Empirical Evidence 
        The experimental study conducted by Abbink (1999) can be used for the purpose at 
hand. It draws on the two-player two-stage bribery game developed by Abbink et al.(1999), 
which is the first experimental game explicitly modeling a bribery situation. Focusing on 
three essential characteristics of corruption, namely reciprocity, negative externalities and 
high penalties when discovered, these authors show that reciprocity may establish bribery 
relationships and reciprocal behavior is exhibited by both public officials and potential bribers 
Occurrence of collusion is not affected by the presence of negative externalities, while the 
magnitude of corruption is significantly reduced by a penalty threat. 
 
       However , in Abbink et al.(1999), corruption is analyzed as a long term relationship in 
which the same potential briber meets the same public official many times. Such an 
hypothesis is relaxed in Abbink (1999); rather that relying on a super game of numerous 
repetition with fixed pairs, a new experiment is conducted to account for the effect of 
supervisory staff rotation, by allowing random assignments between the agents. Thus , two 
games are considered for the test. In the first experiment, one considers a bribery game played 
by fixed pairs of potential  briber and a public official. In the second experiment, the various 
pairs of potential bribers and public officials are randomly assigned to one another on every 
round. A comparison between these two experiments shed light on the influence of staff 
rotation on corruption. 
 
       The main results of the experiments are as follows. On the one hand, significantly lower 
bribes are observed in the staff rotation treatment than in the treatment with fixed pairs. On 
average, transfers are reduced by almost one half. On the other hand, the frequency of 
inefficient decisions resulting from bribery is significantly reduced under rotation 
mechanisms. Besides, reciprocal behavior by public officials is less likely to occur under staff 
rotation. This systematic tendency is not explained by lower level of bribes that supervisory 
officials are offered. Indeed, one of the main differences between the two treatments is due to 
the impossibility for both potential bribers and public officials to reciprocate on favorable 
decisions. Clearly, this leads to a lower magnitude of collusion. Hence, these various 
experiments results argue in favor of supervisory rotation mechanism as a suitable instrument 
in the combat against bribery. 
 
 
    5. Conclusion 
      In this paper, we prove formally insights about the role of organizational measures to 
combat corruption. Using the principal-supervisor-agent paradigm, we study the pattern of 
corrupt collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor. The 
latter is characterized by a psychic or moral cost entailed by guilt and other moral 
considerations when participating in corrupt transactions, and this cost is not necessarily know 
by the agent. We show that a static model is sufficient to analyze the impact of staff rotation  
on corruption. The main result of our paper is that the occurrence of collusion is more likely 
when the agent has perfect information about supervisor’s preferences. Thus , by committing 
himself to a probability of rotating supervisor staff among various locations, the principal can 
significantly affect the magnitude of corruption. 
    
       According to our model, staff rotation is not the sole mechanism that can be used to curd 
corruption. Indeed, instruments aimed at stopping excessive friendship and covert transfers 
between potential bribers and public officials are expected to have bribery reducing impact. 
An example is the use of an external auditor who always reports his truthful signal ( Kofman 
and Lawarée, 1993). In hierarchical organization, personnel rotation mechanisms may be seen 
as an effective device to limit the magnitude of covert transfers among the members. 
However, there exists substantial cost dealing with the rotation of supervisory staff, in 
particular owing the loss of beneficial cooperation. These costs of occupational mobility are 
not included in our analysis. Thus , an extension of our model would be to develop a dynamic 
framework with both the costs and benefits of staff rotation in order to study the optimal 
pattern of rotation mechanisms in the deserving combat against corruption. 
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